For Those Really Interested In Understanding The Metaphysics of Scientific Theories

Let's Get Metaphysical With Criticism of Lakatos and Kuhn --> --> It was Plato who first conceived the program later carried out by Euclid: it was Plato who first recognized the need for a reconstruction; who chose geometry as the new basis, and the geometrical method of proportion as the new method; who drew up the programme for a geometrization of mathematics, including arithmetic, astronomy and cosmology; and who became the founder of the geometrical picture of the world, and thereby also the founder of modern science - of the science of Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler and Newton. During the early 1950s Popper prepared almost a thousand pages of manuscript for publication as a companion volume to the The Logic of Scientific Discovery. For various reasons, publication was delayed though photocopies of the galleys circulated among Popper's colleagues and students, and parts had some early impact, especially by way of Imre Lakatos and his 'methodology of scientific research programmes' (MSRP). Unfortunately, this development has caused a great deal of confusion and misplaced effort which might have been avoided if Popper's theory of programs had appeared earlier. By 1978, it seemed that Popper would never find the time or the energy to pull the manuscript together, especially as advances in physics continually called for revisions. William W. Bartley undertook the task of editing the vast bulk of material and finally The Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery appeared in three volumes (with further additions) in 1982 and 1983. Volume 1 is Realism and the Aim of Science, volume 2 is The Open Universe: An Argument for Indeterminism and volume 3 is Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics. As described in The Purpose of Popper, the third volume contains a 'Metaphysical Epilogue' that is remarkable in at least two ways. First, it is clearly the inspiration for Lakatos' theory of scientific research programmes. Second, it provides a key to understanding a set of themes that unify Popper's whole system of thought. His work can itself be seen as program, with a set of epistemological, metaphysical and methodological theories, and a critical demolition of rivals. He depicts the contest as follows: 1. Indeterminism versus Determinism. 2. Realism versus Instrumentalism. 3. Objectivism versus Subjectivism. The Theory of MRPs Popper's theory of MRPs flows from his theory that we should look at the history of a subject, and its current status, in terms of its problem situations. In the Metaphysical Epilogue he wrote: In science, problem situations are the result, as a rule, of three factors. One is the discovery of an inconsistency within the ruling theory. A second is the discovery of an inconsistency between theory and experiment - the experimental falsification of the theory. The third, and perhaps the most important one, is the relation between the theory and what may be called the "metaphysical research programme". In using this term I wish to draw attention to the fact that in almost every phase of the development of science we are under the sway of metaphysical - that is, untestable - ideas; ideas which not only determine what problems of explanation we shall choose to attack, but also what kinds of answers we shall consider as fitting or satisfactory or acceptable, and as improvements of, or advances on, earlier answers. By raising the problems of explanation, which the theory is designed to solve, the metaphysical research programme makes it possible to judge the success of the theory as an explanation. On the other hand, the critical discussion of the theory and its results may lead to a change in the research programme (usually an unconscious change, as the programme is often held unconsciously, and taken for granted), or to its replacement by another programme. These programmes are only occasionally discussed as such: more often, they are implicit in the theories and in the attitudes and judgements of the scientists. I call these research programmes 'metaphysical' also because they result from general views of the structure of the world and, at the same time, from general views of the problem situation in physical cosmology. I call them 'research programmes' because they incorporate, together with a view of what the most pressing problems are, a general idea of what a satisfactory solution of these problems would look like (page 161). The term 'program' implies that these metaphysical ideas tend to cluster together and support each other in various ways. They also provide historical continuity despite changes in the status of testable theories. A striking example of this is Plato's geometrical cosmology which was designed to overcome the crisis in Greek mathematics when it was found that arithmetic could not satisfactorily treat irrational numbers. Popper wrote at length about this in a massive note 9 to Chapter 6 of The Open Society (1950 edition) and he explicitly referred to the programmatic element of the geometrical world view in Addendum I of the 1957 edition (the source of the extract at the head of this chapter). Many important things are said in the quote above and a program of work is required to unpack the message and show how it can be applied. That work is not attempted here, but some signals are thrown out to suggest some of the directions that such a program would take. Much has been done already, by Agassi, by Watkins and by others who worked independently, as noted below in the section on Parallel Developments. Arthur Koestler's book The Sleepwalkers is a veritable textbook of examples of scientists in the grip of metaphysical preoccupations stumbling over and around the ideas that were required to solve their problems, inspired, blinded and distracted in turn by dreams and speculations of a metaphysical or religious nature. There is a need to pull it together the work that has been done to explore its problem-solving potential when the basic ideas are made explicit and applied to a range of problems, as Popper did in quantum physics. It also needs to be said that one of Popper's mistakes, noted by Agassi and Bartley, was his failure to clearly indicate where he had modified elements of his own program to become more hospitable to metaphysics. The program largely determines the types of problems that are selected for investigation, the methods of approach used and the types of solution that are considered appropriate. Inevitably, discussion of MRPs tends to be somewhat abstract, and is constantly likely to deteriorate under the influence of essentialism (conceptual analysis and obsession with the definition of terms) and ideological agendas. Practical concerns, such as the discipline of experimentation or technological application should help to keep discussion focussed. The review of Evolutionary Epistemology contains some discussion of the way that Popper's ideas on MRPs can be used to take a fresh view on old problems and to clear the ground to make way for new ideas. The Contribution of Lakatos According to Popper (Quest, section 33) he started talking about MRPs in lectures in 1949 and Bartley wrote (in Philosophia, 1982) that MRPs were a major topic of discussion in the London School of Economics when he arrived near the end of the 1950s. However the notion of programmes reached the world outside by way of Lakatos and his writings on "the methodology of scientific research programmes". In the context of the long-running debate between the followers of Popper and Kuhn it is usually accepted that Lakatos took over the running from Popper to save whatever could be retrieved from the 'falsificationist' programme which was widely (though falsely) supposed to have been destroyed in its distinctly Popperian form by Kuhn's theory of paradigms and by similar criticisms launched by Feyerabend and Lakatos himself. For example Alan Chalmers wrote in his widely read book What Is This Thing Called Science? 'Lakatos developed his picture of science [the methodology of scientific research programmes] in an attempt to improve on, and overcome the objections to, Popperian falsificationism'. As described below, the MSRP can be described as a degenerating version of an idea fully developed in Popper's lectures and unpublished manuscripts. Lakatos acknowledged this debt in his paper in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, edited by Lakatos and Musgrave, (1970, page 183), where he even quoted from the metaphysical epilogue. Parallel Views Several other writers appear to have ideas similar in some respects to Popper's theory of MRPs. See also Collingwood's Essay on Metaphysics. Kuhn's paradigms will be discussed below. Toulmin offered some suggestive comments about the role of 'substantive criteria' in "Rationality and the changing aims of inquiry" (from Suppes et al (Eds) Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science vol IV North Holland 1973) he wrote: We have from the outset to drive a wedge between (a) the formal criteria by appeal to which we judge arguments framed in terms of the currently established concepts of any science, and (b) the substantive criteria by appeal to which we judge whether some proposed conceptual innovation is or is not an improvement...The character of these conceptual selection criteria, or standards for judging conceptual improvements, depend directly on what, in the particular domain of science, is conceived of at the particular time as "doing a better explanatory job." (p 892) It appears that his 'substantive criteria' are the criteria provided by a MRP. On page 895 he moved to defuse objections that these criteria are arbitrary, subjective or the products of human idiosyncrasy unchecked by external requirements. His problem here is, of course, to provide an account that avoids subjectivism and the resulting reduction of conceptual schemes to various kinds of social, material or ideological bases in the absence of a theory of autonomous ideas. He concludes that we can give a rational account of the history of science 'only if we are prepared to pay a properly historical attention to the changing intellectual strategies and principles of conceptual change by which the evolving intellectual content of those sciences has been selectively perpetuated'. It seems clear that he is talking about something very similar to metaphysical research programmes, though of course he is using the language of conceptual analysis. Hanson may have come close as well; his patterns of discovery may in fact be patterns of development of MRPs. Similarly, the themes described by Gerald Holton (which he regards as psychological phenomena) can better be described as MRPs. Collingwood wrote some hundreds of pages in An Essay on Metaphysics on the role of metaphysical presuppositions and they way that they influenced the development and understanding of scientific theories. Lovejoy in The Great Chain of Being sketched a theory of 'unit ideas' to describe how metaphysical theories turn up in different forms at different times to influence the work of scientists, even if they never consciously articulate them. MRPs occur outside science, for example Hulme in Speculations was working on a MRP for art and literature (and possibly for society at large). This programme became as influential as any in the literature of the 20th century when it was promulgated by Pound and Eliot. Some problems with Lakatos and Kuhn The value of Popper's theory of MRPs can be brought out by contrast with the views of Lakatos and Kuhn. The value of the theory of MRPs is that it helps to direct critical attention to areas that are particularly in need of criticism, while Lakatos and Kuhn pay no critical attention to these areas at all. 'These areas' are the metaphysical elements of the MRP, or the rival MRPs. Paradigm theory seems to fail at every point, because it does not provide a rational account of the advance of scientific knowledge, nor does it open up fruitful questions for further research, whether in the subject itself, in the history of its development or in the methodology of science or historical reconstruction. Neither paradigm theory nor the MSRP assist in pinpointing where open problems call for one or more of the following responses: a) Efforts to devise critical experiments to test rival (testable) theories. b) Efforts to criticise elements of competing MRPs. c) Efforts to explore how elements of the MRPs are intruding into work in progress, and in particular how elements within an MRP are in conflict and so create problems in sorting out the elements of the open problem situation. An example of this process is provided by Popper in his investigation of the way that determinism forced subjectivism upon workers in quantum mechanics (in volume 3 of The Postscript). There are times when scientific thinking is blocked by the need for something more than better theories or novel ideas for experimentation. There is a need for attention to be paid to the unstated assumptions and metaphors that guide the formulation of problems and determine the kind of solutions that are sought. For example the immune reaction by the body to foreign matter was supposed to involve a mechanism of instruction from the invaders to the immune system to produce the appropriate antibodies. The Australian Nobel Prizewinner, Macfarlane Burnet, followed a hint from Jerne to demonstrate that the mechanism at work is one of selection among a range of responses generated initially by the immune system. A similar shift of focus, from a mechanism of instruction acting on an essentially passive or reactive organism, to one of selection among trials generated by the organism, has important implications in epistemology and evolutionary theory. Popper has drawn out some of these in his critique of inductive and Lamarckian thinking in his intellectual autobiography, Unended Quest. Part of the problem in generating criticism of MRPs is the old problem of the status of non-empirical theories (like moral theories) and how to go about being critical of them in a rational and non-justificationist way. The assumption is widespread that rational criticism cannot exceed the bounds of the empirical, an assumption that Popper held in his early days but later rejected (hence his critical discussion of metaphysical theories in Conjectures and Refutations). It seems that Lakatos revived induction and blocked criticism of the hard core of the program. However with the benefit of the theory of MRPs it is apparent that much if not all of the hard core is metaphysical, and so irrefutable by its nature, not by fiat, as Lakatos would have it. Moreover, it is precisely in the hard core that criticism is most needed, to reframe or reconceptualise problems, to explore whether some apparently silly or irrelevant ideas might actually provide a solution (such as the applications of Popper's theory of objective knowledge). Rafe Champion